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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court's Amended Judgment and Commitment 
and Order Retaining Jurisdiction, entered in Canyon Co. Case No. CR2008-23501*C, 
and from the Judgment and Commitment and Order Retaining Jurisdiction, entered in 
Canyon Co. Case No. CR2011-20389*C. 1 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In 2009, in case number CR2008-23501 *C, Olivas was convicted of sexual 
abuse of a child and sentenced to a unified term of ten years with five years fixed, with 
the district court retaining jurisdiction. (R., pp.63-64.) As required by the Idaho Sexual 
Offender Registration and Community Right-To-Know Act, Idaho Code § 18-8301, et 
seq. (hereinafter "SORA"), Olivas was also ordered to register as a sex offender. (Id.) 
Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Olivas on probation 
for seven years and again ordered him to register as a sex offender. (R., pp.68-73.) 
Olivas failed to register as a sex offender. (See R., pp.167-69.) 
In 2011, in case number CR2011-20389*C, the state charged Olivas with failure 
to register as a sex offender. (R., pp.156-57.) Pursuant to a plea agreement wherein 
the state would limit its sentencing recommendation to five years indeterminate to run 
consecutive to the sentence in Olivas's original case, Olivas pied guilty. (R., pp.160-
62.) In the original case, the state also alleged that Olivas had violated the terms of his 
probation and Olivas admitted the violations. (R., pp.74-80, 89-96, 99-101.) 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court entered an order consolidating the appeals arising from 
case nos. CR2008-23501*C and CR2011-20389*C. (R., pp.122-23, 185-86.) 
1 
In a consolidated sentencing/probation violation disposition hearing, the district 
court revoked probation in the original case and executed the underlying sentence of 
ten years with five years fixed. (R., pp.103-09, 163-65.) In the SORA violation case, 
the district court entered judgment and imposed a sentence of five years indeterminate, 
to run consecutive to the sentence in the original case. (R., pp.103-05, 163-69.) The 
district court retained jurisdiction in both cases. (R., pp.103-09, 163-69.) 
The state filed a Rule 35 motion to correct the illegal sentence, arguing that 
Idaho Code § 18-8311 did not allow the district court to retain jurisdiction in the cases 
because the statute requires probation to be revoked and the sentences to be served 
consecutively. (R., pp.110-12, 170-72.) In ruling on the state's motion, the district court 
agreed that, in accord with State v. Brown, Docket No. 37640, 2011 Op. No. 51 (Ct. 
App., August 16, 2011), it could not retain jurisdiction on a SORA violation committed 
while already on probation under Idaho Code§ 18-8311. (R., pp.125-28, 188-91.) The 
district court disagreed, however, that Idaho Code§ 18-8311 prevented it from retaining 
jurisdiction in the original case. (Id.) The district court denied the state's motion as to 
the original case, but granted the motion as to the SORA violation and entered an 
amended judgment in that case. (R., pp.125-28, 188-91, 202-03.) 
After the period of retained jurisdiction in the original case, the district court, over 
the state's objection, reinstated Olivas on probation for seven years. (R., pp.133-39.) 
The state filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.119-21, 179-81.) 
2 
ISSUE 
Did the district court violate Idaho Code§ 18-8311 when it reinstated Olivas on 




The District Court Violated Idaho Code § 18-8311 By Reinstating Olivas On Probation 
A. Introduction 
After Olivas was found guilty of failing to register under SORA and of violating his 
probation in the original sexual abuse of a minor case, the district court ultimately 
revoked Olivas's probation in the sexual abuse case but retained jurisdiction. (R., 
pp.103-09, 202-03.) After the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court reinstated 
Olivas's probation in the sexual abuse case. (R., pp.133-39.) By reinstating Olivas on 
probation, the district court violated Idaho Code§ 18-8311. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law over 
which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 
798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405, 94 P.3d 709,710 
(Ct. App. 2004). 
C. Under The Applicable Statutes And Facts Of This Case The District Court 
Lacked Legal Authority To Reinstate Probation 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. State 
v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 
139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because "the best guide to legislative 
intent" is the words of the statute, the interpretation of a statute must begin with the 
literal words of the statute. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 
(2009). Where the statutory language is unambiguous, a court does not construe it but 
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simply follows the law as written. McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 
810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable 
of only one reasonable interpretation, it is the Court's duty to give the statute that 
interpretation. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 894-
96, 265 P.3d 502, 507-09 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that Court might not 
give effect to unambiguous language of statute if such was "palpably absurd"). 
The text of Idaho Code § 18-8311 clearly requires probationers who violate 
SORA to serve their sentences. Idaho Code § 18-8311 provides, in pertinent part, 
An offender subject to registration who knowingly fails to register, 
verify his address, or provide any information or notice as required by this 
chapter shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment 
in the state prison system for a period not to exceed ten (10) years and by 
a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000). If the offender is on 
probation ... at the time of the violation, the probation ... shall be revoked 
and the penalty for violating this chapter shall be served consecutively to 
the offender's original sentence. 
I. C. § 18-8311 ( 1 ). This statute requires that the district court do three things when a 
probationer fails to register under SORA: (1) Punish the failure to register as a separate 
felony; (2) revoke probation in the original case; and (3) require the defendant to both 
serve his original sentence and then serve the sentence on the SORA violation, thereby 
serving them consecutively. Thus, by reinstating Olivas on probation, the district court 
granted a probation prohibited by Idaho Code § 18-8311. 
Idaho Code§ 18-8311 does not permit a district court to reinstate the offender on 
probation. Rather, it requires that the offender's probation "shall be revoked and the 
penalty for violating this chapter shall be served consecutively to the offenders original 
sentence." The penalty for the SORA violation cannot be "served consecutively" to the 
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offender's original sentence if that original sentence is suspended and thereby not 
served. 
This case illustrates why reinstatement on probation in the original criminal case 
is not an option under Idaho Code § 18-8311. After being convicted of sexual abuse of 
a minor and completing a period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Olivas 
on probation for seven years. (R., pp.68-73.) Olivas violated that probation by, among 
other things, receiving new charges and a conviction for failing to register as a sex 
offender as required by SORA. (R., pp.125-26.) In sentencing on the consolidated 
cases, after granting in part the state's motion to correct its illegal sentence, the district 
court ultimately retained jurisdiction in the original case and sentenced Olivas on the 
SORA violation, ordering that the sentence on the SORA violation run consecutive to 
the sentence on the original case. (R., pp.125-28, 188-91, 198-200.) After the period of 
retained jurisdiction, the district court reinstated Olivas on probation in the original case 
and committed him to the Department of Correction to serve his sentence on the SORA 
violation. (R., pp.133-39, 200-203.) Thus, the district court is running Olivas's probation 
on the underlying criminal offense concurrent to his executed sentence on the SORA 
violation; Olivas is not serving his sentences consecutively, as required by Idaho Code 
§ 18-8311. 
The fact that Olivas is in prison makes management of a simultaneous probation 
difficult if not impossible. Among the terms of Olivas's probation is the requirement that 
he report in person to probation when requested. (See R., p.137.) In prison, however, 
reporting to his probation officer when requested is beyond Olivas's control. He 
certainly is not free to leave the penitentiary to visit the probation office. Additionally, 
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Olivas could be transferred to a different prison. Under the terms of his probation, 
however, he is not to change residences without first getting the permission of his 
probation officer. (See Id.) Certainly the Department of Correction cannot be required 
to request permission from the probation office in order to transfer Olivas. Moreover, 
completing specific programming required by the district court would also be beyond 
Olivas's control without the Department of Correction's assent. Allowing for concurrent 
personal jurisdiction between the district court and the Department of Correction over 
Olivas and his rehabilitation creates myriad separation of powers issues. 
Even assuming that Olivas could complete his prison sentence on his SORA 
violation while successfully complying with the terms of his probation, the issues raised 
by running the probation in the original criminal case concurrent to Olivas's prison 
sentence are not resolved. In fact, they are actually compounded. Olivas's sentence 
on the SORA violation is an indeterminate five years with no time fixed. (R., pp.202-03.) 
Assuming that the Department of Correction paroled Olivas before the end of his 
indeterminate sentence, if Olivas subsequently violated his parole and probation, 
properly executing his sentences with the sentence on the SORA violation consecutive 
to the sentence on the original case would be complicated if not impossible. 
Even if Olivas were to serve out all five years of his prison sentence, the issues 
created by the district court's violation of Idaho Code § 18-8311 would still be 
unresolved. While Olivas's prison sentence for his SORA violation can last at most five 
years, the district court placed Olivas on probation for seven years. Olivas will therefore 
remain on probation on the underlying criminal offense for two years after he completes 
his sentence on the SORA violation. Were Olivas to offend again during year six and 
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have his probation revoked, his underlying sentence would consequently be executed 
afler he had completed his sentence for his SORA violation, which the statute requires 
him to serve consecutive to the original sentence. See State v. Brown, Docket No. 
37640, 2011 Op. No. 51 at 4 n.4 (Ct. App., August 16, 2011)2 (statute requires SORA 
sentence to be served consecutive to serving sentence on original felony). 
The legislature never intended for violators of SORA to serve their prison 
sentences on their SORA violations concurrent with a period of probation in the 
previously adjudicated case. Inherent in the plain language of Idaho Code § 18-8311 
that the "probation ... shall be revoked and the penalty for violating this chapter shall be 
served consecutively to the offender's original sentence" is a requirement that the 
district court execute the original sentence. Without execution of the original sentence, 
the offender cannot serve the sentence for violating SORA consecutive to the original 
sentence. Therefore, a district court may not suspend the offender's original sentence 
and reinstate probation under Idaho Code § 18-8311. 
Below, the state also argued that Idaho Code § 18-8311 does not permit the 
district court to retain jurisdiction on the original offense in these types of cases. (R., pp. 
110-12, 170-72.) The state recognizes that Idaho Code§ 19-2601(4) gives the district 
court the authority to retain jurisdiction after it imposes sentence. I.C. § 19-2601 (4). 
However, "[t]he principle purpose of retained jurisdiction is to evaluate the defendant for 
his receptiveness to rehabilitation or probation." State v. Petersen, 149 Idaho 808, 812, 
241 P.3d 981, 985 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Diggie, 140 Idaho 238, 240, 91 P.3d 
1142, 1144 (Ct. App. 2004)). Because, as set forth above, the district court ultimately 
2 The opinion in State v. Brown is currently under review by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
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has no authority to place the defendant on probation under Idaho Code § 18-8311, 
retaining jurisdiction in these cases is an exercise in futility at best. Also, "[w]hen a 
court has sufficient information at the time of sentencing to deny probation, its refusal to 
retain jurisdiction for further evaluation is not an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Hernandez, 122 Idaho 227, 230, 832 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. 
Beebe, 113 Idaho 977, 979, 751 P.2d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 1988)). Therefore, the state 
maintains that retaining jurisdiction on the original offense, when the court has no 
authority to ultimately place the defendant on probation, is inappropriate. 
Where a probationer fails to register under SORA, the district court must execute 
the sentence for the original offense, otherwise the offender cannot serve his sentences 
consecutively as required by Idaho Code § 18-8311. The district court violated Idaho 
Code§ 18-8311 by suspending its sentence and reinstating Olivas on probation on the 
underlying offense. The district court's order reinstating Olivas on probatoin should 
therefore be vacated and this case remanded for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
granting probation and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 1st day of October, 2012. 
~ R~ENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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